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Abstract  
 
This paper analyzes the interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance.  
We show that the characteristics of a taxation system impact the size of private benefits 
managers are able to extract. A higher tax rate increases the amount of income a manager would 
divert, while stronger tax enforcement reduces it and, in so doing, can raise the stock market 
value of a company in spite of the increase in the tax burden.  We also show that the corporate 
governance system affects the level and sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes.  When the 
corporate governance system is ineffective (i.e., when it is easy to divert income) or when 
ownership concentration levels are high, an increase in the tax rate can reduce tax revenues 
generating a corporate version of the Laffer-curve.  We test the Laffer-curve predictions in a 
panel of countries. Consistent with the model, we find that corporate tax rate increases have 
smaller (in fact, negative) effects on revenues when ownership is more concentrated and 
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The state, thanks to its tax claim on cash flows, is de facto the largest minority 
shareholder in almost all corporations.  Yet, the state’s actions are not part of the standard 
analysis of corporate governance, which has typically emphasized legal investors’ protections (as 
in La Porta et al (1998) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)), the role of boards (e.g., Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1998)), and the presence of large investors (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)).
1 
At the same time, the public finance literature on taxation typically ignores any effects of 
governance on the functioning of the corporate tax system (see Auerbach (2002) and Hassett and 
Hubbard (1999)).  
In this paper, we provide a simple reason for why the analysis of corporate governance 
and taxation should be integrated. Any transaction that does not have a real economic purpose 
and is designed solely to avoid taxes risks legal challenges and penalties.  As a result, 
corporations are often induced to mischaracterize the purpose of many transactions aimed at 
reducing their tax burden. These forms of concealment involved in sheltering make a company’s 
financial affairs more opaque to outside investors. And this opacity makes it harder for outside 
investors to control insiders.  As a consequence, tax systems that induce sheltering can worsen 
corporate governance. The converse is also true. Better corporate governance implies more 
transparency and this transparency makes it more difficult to shelter income. Hence, better 
corporate governance can reduce tax sheltering.    
More generally, the interaction between corporate governance and taxes can be seen as a 
game among three parties – the state, the insiders, and the outside shareholders. Our claim is 
simply that bilateral interactions have important spillover effects on the third party: the way the 
State designs and enforces taxes impacts the relation between insiders and outside shareholders, 
while the terms of the relation between insiders and outside shareholders (corporate governance) 
impact the working of the corporate taxation system.   
                                                           
1 This absence is even more remarkable, given that corporate taxes are an integral part of the 
literature on corporate financing and investment decisions (e.g. Graham (2003)). 
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system has on the amount of income diverted by insiders. Our key assumption is that tax 
sheltering -- which we define as any decision that if noted by the tax authority would be 
challenged -- makes corporate accounts more opaque and, consequently, makes it easier to divert 
corporate resources.  We validate this assumption by investigating an environment – Russia –  
where both tax avoidance and managerial diversion are more macroscopic.  Based on this 
assumption, we build a simple model where the decision maker is an insider (a controlling 
shareholder or a manager) that must choose the optimal level of sheltering given that sheltering 
is costly because managers that are caught avoiding corporate taxes are fined or jailed.
2   
Within this simple framework we analyze how the corporate tax system affects the level 
of tax sheltering and managerial diversion.  We show that a higher tax rate increases the level of 
diversion, while stronger tax enforcement reduces it.  Not surprisingly, a higher tax rate increases 
the return to tax avoidance strategies and hence the amount of sheltered income.  More 
interestingly, this rate increase will also lead to an increase in the amount of private benefits, 
since insiders can more easily appropriate sheltered income.  By contrast, increased levels of tax 
enforcement reduce the return to sheltering income and, by the same logic, reduce the amount of 
private benefits.  Most interestingly, for low levels of statutory tax rates in weak corporate 
governance environments, an increase in the extent of tax enforcement increases the amount 
outside shareholders will receive (even accounting for the higher amount of taxes paid).  Hence, 
for a given tax rate, an increase in tax enforcement can increase (rather than decrease) the stock 
market value of a company.     
Much as the structure of taxation affects corporate governance, the model introduced in 
the paper also demonstrates that corporate governance affects the working of the tax system. 
When the corporate governance system is ineffective (i.e., when it is easy to divert income) an 
increase in the tax rate can reduce tax revenues, generating a hump-backed relation between 
corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues – a corporate version of the Laffer-curve.  By 
contrast, when it is difficult to divert income, there is a more direct relation between tax rates and 
tax revenues, mitigating the Laffer-curve effect. The reason is that when it is easy to divert 
                                                           
2 Clearly, some degree of income sheltering is legal.  In such cases, the cost we have in mind is an effort cost.  More 
aggressive income sheltering, however, is legally dubious and can result in such penalties. 
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income to avoid taxation.  This effect exacerbates the reduction in reported corporate income in 
response to a rate increase.  The same is true for a high level of ownership concentration. When 
insiders own a large fraction of the cash flow rights, then they internalize more of the benefit of 
tax sheltering, increasing the equilibrium level of sheltering and the responsiveness of sheltering 
to tax increases (and hence the shape of the corporate Laffer curve).     
Finally, we show that there exists an interaction between ownership concentration, the 
corporate governance system, and the equilibrium level of tax avoidance.  In poor corporate 
governance environments, a controlling shareholder with little equity ownership will have too 
strong incentives to shelter income from the tax authorities from the point of view of outside 
investors, because he can steal more from the sheltered income.  By contrast, in a good corporate 
governance environment, a controlling shareholder with little equity ownership will have too 
little incentive to shelter income, from the point of view of outside investors, because he takes 
some personal risk in sheltering income but benefits very little from it.  
We then test the corporate governance and tax policy implications of our model. To test 
the corporate governance implications of taxes, we focus on Russia, an environment where both 
managerial diversion and tax evasion are manifest. We study the effect of the increase in tax 
enforcement that followed Putin’s election on stock prices and the value of control (a proxy for 
the amount of managerial diversion). As predicted by our model, the stock market values of 
companies targeted by enforcement actions increase and the voting premium for these stocks 
decrease after the increase in tax enforcement. The increased tax enforcement also leads to 
substantial organizational changes in the targeted companies, changes that make managerial 
diversion more difficult. 
We then test the corporate tax implications of our model using a panel of countries that 
vary with respect to their ownership concentration and corporate governance rules.  In particular, 
we test the corporate Laffer curve implications by investigating the revenue consequences of 
corporate tax rate changes from 1979-1997. Consistent with the model, we find that corporate tax 
rate increases have a lower impact on tax revenues in countries characterized by weaker 
corporate governance and higher levels of ownership concentration.  In particular, the empirical 
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countries with very small controlling blocks and/or strong corporate governance.  As protection 
of outside shareholders weakens and as ownership concentration increases, these tax revenue 
increases are offset and ultimately outweighed by increased evasion.  The inclusion of other 
control variables associated with the institutional environment – such as rule of law and 
measures of tax compliance – does not alter this result.     
Analyzing taxes from a corporate governance point of view also helps explain why the 
typical U.S. company (which operates in a good corporate governance environment with little 
degree of ownership concentration) exploits too few sheltering opportunities (Weisbach (2002)). 
It also explains why tax sheltering increases with an increase in ownership concentration or an 
increase in pay-per performance sensitivity (Desai, Dharmapala, Jenter and Park (2003)).  
Finally, this view is able to explain why firms are willing to pay taxes not owned on fraudulently 
reported earnings to keep the IRS from monitoring them, as Erickson et al. (2003) show.  
Finally, our results have implications for the design of tax systems. They suggest that the 
fiscal effects of any corporate tax reform cannot be assessed without looking at the pre-existing 
corporate governance situation and prevailing levels of ownership concentration.  They also 
suggest a clear direction for reforms in emerging markets. An increase in tax enforcement can 
provide payoffs to both governments and outside shareholders, as it generates greater revenue 
and higher outside share values.   
Our paper explores only one dimension of the interaction between corporate governance 
and taxation. Arlen and Weiss (1995) emphasize the impact of taxes on the agency problem 
between managers and shareholders - taxes favor retention exacerbating the problem. Roe (1991) 
claims that in the United States taxes penalize ownership structures that facilitate monitoring. 
Finally, Morck (2003) focuses on the effect double taxation of dividends has on ownership 
concentration (in particular stock pyramiding).    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a clinical study of Sibneft, 
a Russian oil company, that illustrates the links between corporate tax avoidance and private 
benefits of control in a setting where both phenomena are manifest.  Section 3 presents a model 
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predictions on how corporate taxation affects corporate governance and how corporate 
governance affects corporate taxation.  Section 4 tests the corporate governance implications of 
tax enforcement changes using recent changes in Russia, while Section 5 tests the effects of 
corporate governance and ownership concentration on the impact of corporate tax changes in a 
panel of countries.  Section 6 discusses how this corporate governance view of corporate taxation 
provides a rationale for the existence of a separate tax rate on corporate profits with many (but 
not all)of the features of the existing U.S. corporate tax system.  Section 7 concludes. 
2.   Tax Sheltering and Managerial Malfeasance  
Both tax avoidance and managerial diversion are phenomena that are difficult to 
document.  In fact, enormous effort is undertaken to ensure that these phenomena are not easily 
observable.  As a result, in this paper we introduce various sources of empirical evidence – 
case study, cross-industry, within-industry, and cross-country– that taken together paint a 
consistent picture. 
To understand how sheltering and diversion can interact, we begin with a case study of an 
oil company in Russia, a setting where managerial diversion and tax sheltering are more 
macroscopic.  We choose Sibneft, the 5
th largest Russian integrated oil company, because it was 
one of the first companies to be indicted for tax evasion.  Subject to all the inherent limitations of 
a case study, this focus on a single company allows us to see the organizational responses 
associated with sheltering and diversion surrounding a change in tax policy. 
While we choose to illustrate the links between tax avoidance and managerial diversion 
in Russia, where both phenomena are more macroscopic, we do not think this interaction exists 
only in emerging markets.  The indictments of executives at Tyco Incorporated and the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (2003) investigation of Enron make clear that tax sheltering vehicles, 
including special purpose vehicles, were used by managers to enrich themselves.
3  
2.1.   High tax rates, high sheltering and diversion 
Under President Yeltsin, high tax rates and low levels of tax enforcement encouraged 
Russian firms to shelter income aggressively.  Multiple taxes from different levels of government 
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4  Company executives were not shy about 
how this tax burden affected their behavior. As Yukos Oil CEO Khodorkovsky argued, "As long 
as the tax regime is unjust, I will try to find a way around it."
5  
A popular tax evasion device was to sell oil at below-market prices to outside trading 
companies. To get a sense of the magnitude of the manipulation in transfer pricing, analyst 
reports indicate that Sibneft’s production subsidiary was selling oil at just $2.20/ barrel, 
considerably below the average export price (net of export costs and excise taxes) of $13.50, and 
the average domestic price (net of taxes) of $7.20/ barrel.
6  Consistently, company financials 
reveal an effective corporate tax rate of just 2.6%, far below the statutory rate of 30%.  While 
firms described such activity as ‘tax optimization’ and emphasized its legality,
 7 First Deputy 
Finance Minister Ignativev, in a widely circulated memorandum, used different words: “it 
appears that several companies actively use special tax-evasion schemes, by using front 
companies registered in domestic and foreign offshore zones, and by manipulating prices.”
8   
The use of ‘third party intermediaries’ to shelter income also provided controlling 
shareholders with sizable opportunities for self-enrichment at the expense of outside 
shareholders.  To shelter income most if not all the profits have to be shifted to an intermediary 
located in an offshore or onshore tax haven. In the case of Sibneft, the primary intermediary was 
the export trading company Runicom, which accounted for close to all of Sibneft’s foreign sales 
through 2000.
9  Shifting profits to Runicom benefits Runicom shareholders at the expense of the 
shareholders of Sibneft and its separately listed production and refining subsidiaries. Since the 
controlling management of Sibneft can choose the intermediary to trade with, there are obvious 
opportunities for them to take advantage of the situation and channel the profits toward a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 An in-depth analysis of Tyco’s case is available from the authors.  
4 In the oil industry, taxes included not only the traditional value-added and corporate profit taxes, but also excise taxes, export 
duties and specific geology and royalty taxes on net income at production subsidiaries. 
5 Quoted in Simon Pirani, “Oligarch? No, I'm just an oil magnate,” Observer, Sunday June 4, 2000. 
6 “Oil Production Subsidiaries," Troika Dialog Research Report, February 2000. 
7 Sibneft acknowledges in public filings, for example, that for “tax and cash flow optimization purposes, the Company uses third 
party intermediaries in its refining and distribution process.” Sibneft Bond OfferingProspectus, March 1, 2002, pg. F-8 “These 
arrangements have primarily comprised of using certain trading companies in certain Russian regions and, taken together, have 
reduced the amount of taxable income Sibneft reports” Sibneft Bond Offering Prospectus, December 3, 2002, pp. 16-17. 
8  Jeanne Whalen and Guy Chazan, “Russia Considers Probe Into Oil Industry’s Taxes – Official Accuses Companies of Evading 
Payments,” Asian Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2000, pg. A24  Recognizing this difference in interpretation, companies identified 
potential challenges to tax practices as a risk that could have a material impact on operations. 
9 For example, company financials identify 38 (40) percent of all sales in 1999 (2000) being conducted through Runicom. Prior to 
1998, the primary company was Runicom SA registered in the tax haven of Switzerland and in 1999 and 2000, Runicom ltd, 
registered in the tax haven of Gibraltar.  
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structure of Russian companies, which makes it difficult to establish whether this is indeed the 
case. In this particular case, for example, Runicom was associated with Roman Abramovich, 
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10  Runicom was also a significant Sibneft shareholder
11, but 
not vice-versa, as would have made sense if the goal was to equitably share the benefits of tax 
sheltering.     
2.2.   Can higher tax enforcement lead to higher stock prices?  
If tax sheltering increases the opportunities for managerial diversion, higher tax 
enforcement should reduce them, benefiting outside shareholders. Sibneft provides some 
evidence in this respect.    
Following Putin’s election in 2000, tax enforcement in Russia increased without any 
immediate change in tax rates.   One of the first actions that signaled Putin’s intention was the 
release of a memorandum with a list of the worst corporate tax offenders (July 28, 2000). Sibneft 
was singled out as paying the lowest tax rate in the oil industry.  In August, the tax police raided 
the offices of Sibneft and of its export trading arm, leading to criminal charges against the 
company.  In November, the Tax Police announced proposals aimed at closing channels for tax 
avoidance by oil companies, including a threat to reduce oil company revenues by auctioning 
space on government-owned pipelines (rather than allocating them at a price that covered costs). 
On January 25, 2001, President Vladimir Putin met with oligarchs to discuss ending of tax 
avoidance schemes and the passage of new tax laws designed to shut off such schemes. Sibneft 
remained a target of government action, with the filing of additional criminal and civil actions in 
the spring and summer of 2001.
12 
Not surprisingly, this increase in enforcement targeted at the oil industry in general, and 
Sibneft in particular coincided with a dramatic increase in tax payments by Sibneft:  production-
based taxes increased ten fold and the reported effective corporate tax rate for Sibneft as a whole 
jumped from 2.6% to 10.4%.  More interestingly, following the pressure from government 
officials, Sibneft announced that it would no longer be trading with Runicom but would do 
trading with a newly created subsidiary SibOil whose results would be reported in the holdings 
                                                           
10 The controlling stake of top management exceeded 80 percent, with a personal stake rumored to exceed 40 percent, “Sibneft's 
Owners Nation's Worst-Kept Secret”. By Valeria Korchagina. 11 April 2000, The Moscow Times. 
11 Runicom bought a 12.22% stake in Sibneft in 1996, and held 27 % of Sibneft’s shares at the end of 2000, “EBRD Slams 
Russian Courts In Loan Dispute With Oil Firm --- Lender Says Case Will Test Putin's Pledge to Strengthen Legal System --- 
The Rule of Law vs. the Rule of `Oligarchs' “By Andrew Higgins, 11 February 2000, Wall Street Journal Europe, p. 2. 
12 We focus on these enforcement actions that appeared to be targeted on increasing government revenue rather than some other 
events that involved tax police that commentary at the time suggested was more politically than economically motivated. 
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13  Furthermore, in July of 2001 the company announced that it 
would acquire two previously undisclosed intermediaries located in Russian domestic tax 
havens, Vester and Olivesta, that reported profits of $300 million in 2000, for a mere $1,800 in 
Sibneft stock.
14  Shortly thereafter, Sibneft announced the closing of yet more subsidiaries and a 
commitment to market oil through fully owned subsidiaries not located in these tax havens.
15     
Most importantly – from our point of view — these enforcement actions coincided with 
an improved return for outside shareholders.  Reported company income soared and, for the first 
time, Sibneft paid a dividend: $53 million in November 2000 and close to $1 billion in 2001, an 
amount equal to 67 percent of the total market capitalization of Sibneft before the increase in 
enforcement.  Consequently, Sibneft’s share price rose well in excess of industry trends.  
Although such returns cannot be interpreted as causal, since many other factors may be driving 
returns aside from changes in tax policy, they do suggest that tax changes have not impeded 
returns for minority investors. 
By narrowing the time period, and focusing specifically on a few notable tax enforcement 
events, we can control for some of these other factors.  Table 1 reports Sibneft excess returns in 
the days surrounding the most crucial enforcement events. In all cases but one, Sibneft stock 
outperformed the Russian Index and, in spite of the very high volatility of Russian excess 
returns, in a few instances these excess returns are more than two standard deviations away from 
zero.  
The more astute local observers were quick to draw a causal link between increased tax 
enforcement and greater shareholder returns. As the Financial Times reported, companies like 
Sibneft “have begun closing offshore subsidiaries and consolidating their operations within 
Russia. To comply with the law, they have to declare higher profits and pay higher taxes. They 
                                                           
13 Lukoil, Tyumen Oil Co and Yukos made similar announcements in December of plans to increase transparency by shifting 
exports from trading companies controlled by controlling shareholders to major trading companies.  See, for example, NEFTE 
Compass, December 21, 2000” Umbrella – Yukos Blends Offshore Trading Arms into One” 
14   “CorporateGovernance Actions,” Troika Dialog, Weekly Bulletin #113, July 13, 2001, pg. 6.   
15 For example, Sibneft later purchased Terra in a deal reported to have roughly the same effect of increasing reported income by 
$300 million NEFTE Compass, October 11, 2001, “Terra Firma – Sibneft Brings its Profits Back Home.” 
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as keen to have a share of the proceeds as the tax inspector.”
16   
To illustrate how such a surprising result – that an increase in the effective tax rate could 
lead to an increase in stock prices-- may come about, we start with a simple numerical example 
provided in Figure 1. We focus on the possibility of using transfer pricing to avoid a 20 % 
corporate income tax imposed on oil extracting companies, a feature of the Russian tax code at 
that time. When tax enforcement is low, a firm can have its production subsidiary sell oil at cost 
to an export-trading arm. In this way, the 20% tax at the production level is completely avoided.  
When tax enforcement increases, the traditional view of taxes, which ignores managerial 
diversion, has an unequivocal prediction: the share price will go down. To see this result, 
compare the left and the right hand side of the top panel of Figure 1. An increase in enforcement 
stops artificial transfer pricing and forces the production entity to sell oil at $13 a barrel rather 
than at $2.  As expected, income will go up, but so will taxes. As a direct consequence of the 
increased tax payment, the value of a share will drop, from $15.40 to $12.30.   
Once we consider the interaction between tax sheltering and managerial diversion – an 
approach we label a ‘governance view of taxes’ -- the outcome can be reversed. Tax enforcement 
(a move from the left to the right hand side in the bottom half of the panel) again forces the 
production entity to sell at market prices and tax payments increase. But, as a result of the 
reduced tax sheltering, the amount appropriated by insiders will also go down. Hence, outside 
shareholders on the one hand see the value of their claim reduced by higher taxes, on the other 
hand see it increased by less diversion. The final outcome obviously depends upon the relative 
magnitude of the tax imposed by the government relative to the “tax” imposed by insiders. As 
our example illustrates, in an environment characterized by rampant diversion, the value of 
outside shareholders’ claims can increase with greater enforcement.
17  
3.  A Simple Model of Tax Evasion and Managerial Diversion 
                                                           
16 Andrew Jack, Financial Times, September 17, 2001. 
17 For this example, we choose a basic diversion rate of 10 percent with additional incremental diversion from sheltered income 
of 20 percent. 
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more easily appropriated by managers. This point has not been formally analyzed in the growing 
literature on optimal tax sheltering (e.g., Chen and Chu (2003) and Crocker and Slemrod 
(2003)).
18   This section formalizes such a link and derives implications both for the overall 
corporate governance system and for the effect of corporate taxes.  
In order to do so, we need an operative definition of sheltering.  Unfortunately, there is 
little consensus in the legal and economic literature on what sheltering precisely is.
19  For our 
purposes, we will define it as any activity that lowers taxable income and, if noted by the tax 
authority, would be challenged.  According to this definition, a non aggressive use of a standard 
tax shield, debt for instance, is not sheltering.  But an aggressive use of the same tax shield, i.e., a 
special purpose vehicles used to reduce taxes that could be challenged by the IRS, would 
constitute sheltering. If we accept this definition, then sheltering does imply some concealment. 
At the very least, a company would need to disguise in its official documents the real nature of 
such sheltering or it could be challenged. These concealed activities create more opportunities 
for managerial diversion.   
3.1. Model  setup 
Let s  be the proportion of income that is sheltered from tax authorities.  The 
benefit of income sheltering is that sheltered income avoids corporate taxes, while non-sheltered 
income is taxed at rate t.  We assume income sheltering is costly to insiders, as they have to exert 
effort to do so and, more importantly, because they run a personal risk if their strategy is deemed 






=   
whereα is a parameter that captures the quality of the tax enforcement regime. The higher the 
enforcement, the more likely it is that insiders are accused of illegal tax sheltering and thus the 
                                                           
18 In their empirical study of private benefits of control, Dyck and Zingales (2003) document the effect of better tax 
enforcement on private benefits. They do not, however, formally analyze the relation between the two.  
19 Both Shaviro (2000) and Weisbach (2002) detail alternative rationales for classifying and defining sheltering.  
Most commentators agree, as Weisbach (2002) notes, that “there is no a priori definition of shelters.”    
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20 As Crocker and Slemrod (2003) argue, there are laws 
providing for both criminal and civil penalties for tax evasion in the United States, with public 
attention in tax cases introducing additional reputational penalties for managers.  While criminal 
sanctions in tax evasion cases are rare in the US, they are far more common abroad.   
The model relies critically on the assumption that sheltered income can be more easily 
appropriated by insiders.  As the Sibneft example illustrates, the ambiguity over the true nature 
of sheltered income facilitates greater diversion out of those amounts.  We capture this idea by 
assuming that insiders divert a higher fraction of the sheltered income than of the income 
declared to tax authorities. If γ  is the fraction of non-sheltered income appropriated by insiders, 
then the fraction of sheltered income appropriated will be β γδ = + , with  0. δ >  Since the larger 
γ is, the worse corporate governance is,(1 ) γ − is an index of the quality of corporate 
governance and δ is a measure of the degree to which sheltered income is more easily diverted 
relative to non-sheltered income.  
Without loss of generality, we normalize the company’s true profit (pre-tax, pre-
sheltering, and pre-diversion) to 1. Then, an insider who owns a fraction λ of the shares obtains 
a payoff of  
(1) 
2 [(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )] (1 )(1 )
2
C Vs t s s t s s
α
λγ βγ β =−− − + − + −− + −. 
The first term in square bracket is the value an insider obtains qua shareholder. The second and 
third terms, by contrast, are the amount she expropriates thanks to her controlling position.  The 
last term is her personal cost of sheltering.  
Outside shareholders collectively get 
(2) (1 )[(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )]
M Vs t s λ γβ =− − − −+ −  
as they do not receive diverted income and also do not bear the costs of sheltering. 
                                                           
20 Of course, sheltering income also imposes a cost on the company. For simplicity, however, we abstract from this 
aspect, since it does not change the flavor of our results. 
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Given the concavity of equation (1), the optimal amount of sheltering for the insiders, 
* s , 
can be derived from the first order condition. Assuming an interior solution, we have  
* [( 1 ) ] ( 1 ) [( 1 t
s




Note that in choosing the optimal level of sheltering, insiders will only look at their own benefits 
(equation 1) ignoring the impact on outside shareholders.  This level of sheltering can be too 
much or too little with respect to what outside shareholders would like.
21   
From an outside shareholders’ perspective, the optimal level of income sheltering trades 
off expropriation by the government through the tax system and expropriation by insiders.  Any 
dollar of income that is sheltered avoids the corporate tax, but is “taxed” (expropriated) more 
heavily by insiders, and this additional expropriation can exceed the cost of the corporate tax.  In 









 If  , additional expropriation by insiders made possible by the sheltering of the 
income offsets any gains from reduced taxes and outside shareholders are better off when there is 
no sheltering. By contrast, when t , the burden of corporate taxes is greater than the additional 
expropriation insiders impose on sheltered income, so sheltering benefits outside shareholders.  
tt <
t >
It is critical to note that   is a function of the underlying corporate governance system. In 
a world where corporate governance is perfect (
t 
0 β γ = = ,  0 t =  ), outside shareholders 
unambiguously benefit from sheltering since they bear no cost of sheltering and reap all the 
benefits.  Clearly, the result would be less extreme if they bear some cost of the sheltering, but 
the fundamental tension between the interest of insiders and that of the outside shareholder 
remains.  Indeed, this is the common intuition of how shareholders benefit from increased tax 
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able to appropriate all the sheltered income ( ) 1 β = , then outside shareholders would like no 
sheletering of income.  Similarly, the degree to which sheltered income is more easily diverted 
(δ ) also matters critically for the preferences of outside shareholders over sheltering activity.   




More generally, it is clear that the optimal level of sheltering depends critically on the 
available diversionary technology.     
Result 1: The optimal amount of tax sheltering increases in the tax rate, t, and decreases in 
the level of corporate governance(1 ) γ − , tax enforcement α , and, if tt < , insider 
ownership λ. By contrast, if t  the optimal amount of tax sheltering increases in the level 
of insider ownership 
t >

















= >  
*
2
[( 1 ) ] ( 1 ) [( 1 ) ds t
d
βλ β γλ γ
αα
+−− − +−
=− < ;  
*






=− −− − < if t  and >0 if  .  t < t 
The first result is obvious: a higher tax rate makes tax sheltering more advantageous and 
this will lead to a higher amount of diversion. The second result is more interesting in so much as 
it identifies an interaction between the incentives to shelter and the quality of the corporate 
governance system. A controlling shareholder captures only a fraction of the tax benefit of 
sheltering (while in our model she bears the entire cost). The worse the corporate governance 
system (and thus the more she can expropriate), the more she will internalize the benefit of tax 
sheltering, and hence the more she will shelter income.  We return to this point below.  The third 
result is more straightforward.  If the personal cost borne by the manager to shelter income goes 
up (i.e., there is increased enforcement), the level of income sheltered goes down.  The fourth 
result indicates that the relative importance of taxation versus expropriation drives the interaction 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
21 The outside shareholder optimal level does not coincide with the first best level either. In considering the trade 





Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressbetween ownership and tax sheltering. A higher controlling stake makes insiders internalize 
more the value distributed to all shareholders relative to the value of his private benefits. If tt <  
the value distributed to all shareholders decreases with sheltered income, hence insiders will 
shelter less when she owns more stock. The opposite is true, if  .   tt >
Result 2: The impact of insider ownership on the optimal amount of tax sheltering increases 
in the level of corporate governance (1 ) γ − .   










Greater insider ownership induces insiders to internalize more of the security benefits and 
hence the interest of outside shareholders. In good corporate governance regimes, outside 
shareholders like sheltering because the government is more rapacious (i.e., takes a bigger cut) 
than insiders. And the better the corporate governance system is (the higher the (1 − γ )), the 
more appealing sheltering is. Hence, the more cash flow rights controlling shareholders own, the 
more they want to shelter income.  
By contrast, in countries where the corporate governance system is bad, majority 
shareholders are more rapacious and, thus, from the outside shareholders’ point of view 
sheltering becomes less appealing. Hence, the more cash flow rights insiders own, the more they 
will think as outside shareholders and the weaker are their incentives to shelter. In fact, if tt <  
(i.e., the government is less rapacious than the majority shareholders) the amount of tax 
sheltering decreases in the level of insider ownership.  If we consider the United States as having 
a relatively good corporate governance system, this evidence is consistent with Desai, 
Dharmapala, Jenter and Park (2003), who find that in the United States sheltering increases with 
an increase in ownership concentration or an increase in pay-per performance sensitivity.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
off, they ignore the cost of sheltering borne by the managers.  
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  These results on the optimal level of sheltering and the preferences of outside investors 
over sheltering readily translate into results concerning the effect of changes in enforcement.   
Result 3: If  , the market value of a company increases when tax enforcement increases.      tt <
Proof: The market value of shares reflects the value of outside shares. Hence, 
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=− < . Hence, the result follows.  
Result 3 is nothing more than a formalization of the example illustrated in Figure 1, 
which we discussed in section 2.2.  In the traditional view of corporate taxes (where the effect of 
taxes on managerial dilution is not considered), an increase in tax enforcement necessarily leads 
to a decrease in stock prices, since companies will be forced to pay more taxes and hence they 
will be worth less. Once we take into account the effects of tax enforcement on managerial 
diversion (what we call a corporate governance view of taxes), this conclusion can be 
overturned. By reducing the amount of tax sheltering, an increase in tax enforcement not only 
increases the amount of taxes paid to the Government, but also reduces the amount appropriated 
by the majority shareholder. If t , the taxes paid on declared income are less than the 
additional income expropriated by insiders. Hence, outside shareholders are better off.  Since the 
market value of shares reflects the value outside shareholders receive, stock market value can 
increase with greater enforcement. 
t <
These results also carry implications for control premia.  Following Dyck and Zingales 
(2003), let  us define the control premium (CP) as the difference between the per share payoff 
controlling shareholders receive and that outside shareholders receive, normalized by the total 
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,  the result follows.  
The result is fairly intuitive. Higher tax enforcement increases the cost of sheltering 
income. This reduces the payoff of controlling shareholders (V ) and if t
C t <  increases the 
payoff of outside shareholders (V ). Hence, the control premium will drop.  
m
  In addition to these results on the effects of enforcement on share values, it is possible to 
consider the effects of tax rates on share values. 
Result 4: An increase in the tax rate t reduces both the value of outside shareholders (V ) 
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3.4.  The effect of the tax system on tax revenues – The corporate Laffer Curve 
  Our simple model of tax sheltering has, as a natural consequence, the possibility that 
corporate tax revenues will decrease when corporate tax rates increase. Given the strong analogy 
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Laffer curve.      
Result 5: For intermediate levels of tax enforcement, there is a Laffer curve for corporate tax 
revenues.  
Proof:  Corporate tax revenues (CTR) are given by t (1 ) s − . Differentiating this with respect 
to t we obtain 
(1 ) 1
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, the 
derivative is positive at t=0. If α βλ β γ <+ − + − γλ + , then the derivative is 
negative at t=1.  
  Not only does Result 5 establish the possibility of a Laffer curve, but it also suggests it 
may occur for parameter values that are consistent with international evidence on taxation.  For 
example, with insider ownership of 50%, diversion of taxable income equal to 10%, and 
diversion of sheltered income equal to 30%, the level of tax enforcement α should be between 
0.1 and 1.2 for the Laffer curve to arise. A value of α equal to 0.1 means that the expected 
marginal cost of stealing one dollar is 10 cents, while a value of 1.2 means that the expected 
marginal cost of stealing one dollar is 1 dollar and 20 cents. This appears to be a reasonable 
range.  
  The most interesting aspect of the corporate governance view of taxes, however, is not 
the existence of a Laffer curve per se, but the link between the shape of the Laffer curve and two 
keys indicators of the a corporate governance system: the level of ownership concentration λ 
and the amount of feasible diversion γ .  These parameters, as in the empirical work that 
follows, should be interpreted as referring to the representative firm in a country.  
Corollary 2: A higher level of insider ownership and a lower level of corporate governance 
(higher level of γ ) reduce the revenue maximizing tax rate. A higher level of tax 
enforcement increases the revenue maximizing tax rate. 
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Differentiating this term with respect to  ,, λ γαand remembering that β γδ = + , delivers the 
results.  
The two plots in Figure 2 illustrate the effect of the corporate governance system and 
ownership concentration on the corporate Laffer curve.   The left plot examines the relationship 
between tax revenues and tax rates as a function of the size of insiders’ block size.
22  When there 
is no large shareholder there is no Laffer curve, as revenues are always increasing in tax rates. 
However, as the size of the controlling block increases, the typical Laffer effect appears.  The 
revenue-maximizing tax rate, then, starts to decrease in the controlling block size.   
This result also depends upon the level of corporate governance.   Since in the plot we 
have chosen γ = 0.1, this plot should be interpreted as applying to countries with reasonably 
good corporate governance systems. The right plot in Figure 2 shows the same graph for a worse 
level of corporate governance (γ = 0.7).  In such settings, the situation is reversed. The revenue 
maximizing level of the corporate tax rate increases with the level of insider ownership.   
The left plot in Figure 3 shows that for a given level of insider ownership the shape of the 
Laffer curve depends also on the quality of the governance system.
23  Specifically, as governance 
deteriorates the revenue-maximizing tax rates decreases for the reason discussed above.  Finally, 
the right plot of Figure 3 traces the effects of changes in enforcement on the revenue-maximizing 
rate.  Again, as enforcement decreases, the revenue-maximizing tax rate also decreases. These 
results suggest that in environments characterized by imperfect tax enforcement and potential 
diversion by controlling shareholders, the revenue-maximizing rates may be considerably lower 
than anticipated, due to the interaction between tax sheltering and managerial diversion.   
3.5.  The effect of personal taxes 
  Thus far, we have not factored in the analysis of personal taxes. Of course, both 
controlling and outside shareholders care about their after tax income. The effect of a personal 
                                                           
22 In this simulation, alpha is held at 0.7, gamma is 0.1, and delta is 0.2.   
23 In this simulation, alpha is held at 0.7 and the controlling block size is held at 0.5.   





http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art75income tax, however, depends upon which income is subject to personal taxes. We assume that 
all the income distributed to shareholders is taxed at tp, while the remaining income, which is 
diverted by the manager, is not taxed. This captures the idea that diverted income is channeled 
through tax havens and as such is not subject to income taxes, while dividends distributed to all 
shareholders cannot avoid taxation. Then, the payoff to insiders and to the outside shareholders 
becomes  
(1*) 
2 (1 ) [(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )] (1 )(1 )
2
C
p Vts t s s t s = − −−− + −+ −− + − s
α
λγ β γ β  
and 
(2*)  (1 )(1 )[(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )]
M
p Vt s t s =− − − − − + − λ γβ . 
 Accordingly, the optimal amount of sheltering then becomes  










  The effect of personal taxes is to decrease the effective ownership by insiders. Where in 
* s  the insider ownership was λ in 
*' s  the effective insider ownership is  (1 ) p t − λ . Hence, from 
Corollary 2 we derive  
Corollary 3: If  , the amount of tax sheltering increases in the personal tax rate and hence 
corporate tax revenues decrease in the personal tax rate. The opposite is true if  .  
tt <
tt >
This result suggests that the shape of the corporate Laffer curve is affected not only by 
ownership concentration and corporate governance, but also by the level of personal tax rates. 
Furthermore, this interaction is affected by the quality of the corporate governance system and 
by the level of ownership concentration itself. In fact, we can reinterpret Figure 3 in terms of 
personal tax rate. Since in our model an increase in the personal tax rate is equal to a decrease in 
insider ownership, the left panel of Figure 3 suggests that when corporate governance is good 
high personal tax rates lead to higher corporate tax revenues, while lower personal tax rates lead 
to lower corporate tax revenues. The opposite is true when corporate governance is poor as in the 
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should lead to an increase in corporate revenues, while in the United States the opposite should 
be true.  
3.6.  Robustness and Limitations of the Model  
The interaction between corporate governance and taxes can be seen as a game among 
three parties – the state, the insiders, and the outside shareholders. The externality we have 
emphasized is that the way the State designs and enforces taxes impacts the relation between 
insiders and outsiders, while the terms of the relation between insiders and outsiders (corporate 
governance) impact the working of the corporate taxation system. Of course, bilateral contracts 
can try to minimize these externalities. The State, for instance, can demand higher payments 
from insiders under the form of bribes, in exchange for allowing a company to become more 
rather than less opaque to outsiders. While this might seem a remote possibility in the United 
States, it is not unconceivable in countries like Russia. Such strategy, however, encounters two 
problems. First, nothing guarantees that after paying its bribe a company is not subject to 
additional requests for bribes. The advantage of taxes is that the State can commit not to harass a 
company twice. Second, the State faces an agency problem in its collection of taxes. If it accepts 
bribes instead of official tax payments, it finds it difficult to limit the skimming of the proceeds 
done by its delegated agents. Hence, collusion between the State and insiders at the expenses of 
outsiders has its own disadvantages. On the other hand, insiders would like to collude with 
outsiders to reduce their tax burden, but this agreement is prevented because outsiders are 
dispersed.  
Taxation is not the only interaction between the State and insiders that affect minority 
shareholders. The threat of nationalization (or renationalization, as in the Russian case) has 
similar effects. The higher is the threat of nationalization, the higher is the expected tax rate, and 
the more insiders are tempted to dilute. This factor contributes to explain the egregious examples 
of diversion that occurred in Russia during the Yeltsin presidency.  
  In the model, we assume that outsiders have no power over insiders. While this might be 
an appropriate characterization of some situations (for example a majority shareholder), it is not 
general. Incorporating the fact that outsiders may have some power, however, will not 
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sheltering. Hence, they will not oppose all mechanisms to avoid taxes, even if these mechanisms 
come at the expense of greater opacity, which might worsen their ability to monitor. In the Enron 
case, for example, outside board members approved the creation of special purpose entities 
(SPE) convinced that these will benefit outside shareholders. Nevertheless, the opacity created 
by these SPEs facilitated –according to court documents—misappropriation by insiders. Hence, 
while the level of tax sheltering (and thus of managerial diversion) crucially depends upon the 
structure of the bargaining process between insiders and outsides, higher taxes would always 
lead to more tax sheltering and more enforcement to less, regardless of outside shareholders’ 
bargaining power. 
  In the model, there is also no connection between the level of tax enforcement,α , and the 
level of the tax rate, t.  In practice, however, the two might be connected. A zero tax rate does 
not encourage much enforcement as it does not generate any revenue to justify the effort. For 
moderate levels of taxes, higher rates, which generate higher revenues, are likely to engender 
more support for enforcement.  It is only at extremely high tax rates that the support for 
enforcement vanishes as these rates are often perceived as confiscatory. This nonmonotonic 
relation complicates our comparative static on the effect of a tax rate change, but not the 
predictions of the effects of changes in enforcement. Higher enforcement will always lead to less 
sheltering and less diversion. 
  In the model, we also ignore the possibility of corruption of tax enforcement agents. If 
this possibility exists, the model’s comparative static with respect to changes in the tax rates is 
substantially unchanged. Higher tax rates should make more expensive not only the tax bill but 
also the bribe to avoid paying taxes. Again, managerial diversion would increase with increased 
tax rates.
24  To discuss the comparative static with respect to enforcement, we need to define 
what it means to have higher enforcement in a world where tax agents are corrupt. If we mean 
bona fide enforcement (i.e. effective monitoring), then the comparative static will remain 
unchanged. If, by contrast, higher enforcement means only a broader mandate for tax officers to 
                                                           
24 In fact, in the case of corruption the effect might be more macroscopic because once the increase in taxes makes it 
worthwhile to bribe the tax inspector, then there is no threat of monitoring left and the degree of dilution might rise 
dramatically. 
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bribes to avoid being caught, which should decrease the level of tax sheltering and thus of 
managerial diversion. But high enforcement might also mean that more corporations have to pay 
bribes to silence tax inspectors, at which point they are free to do whatever they want, including 
massively diverting income from minority shareholders.   
  If we introduce the possibility of corruption, however, there is another reason why our 
model is relevant.  In countries where bribes are a common business practice, the inability to pay 
them represents a severe disadvantage. But if bribes have to be paid, where does the money come 
from?  While some countries allow explicit accounting (and deductibility) for bribes paid in 
foreign countries (e.g. Germany), we are not aware of any country that allows explicit 
accounting of domestic bribes. Hence, short of using their own money, insiders have to create 
some hidden slush funds. As a result, the need to pay bribes generates even more opacity in 
companies’ balance sheets, making it easier for insiders to appropriate some of this hidden value. 
Thus, corruption favors misappropriation by insiders also through this channel.    
4.   Corporate Governance Implications  
The corporate governance view of taxes has implications both for corporate governance 
and for corporate taxation.  We will test the former in this section and the latter in the next.  
Testing the corporate governance implications is more difficult. The prediction that is 
easiest to test (i.e., that an increase in the tax rates reduces stock prices) is not unique to this 
approach: the same implication also follows from a traditional view of taxes. By contrast, the 
predictions that are unique to this approach (the effect of enforcement on stock prices and control 
premia) require us to measure variables that are difficult to quantify (tax enforcement) or even to 
observe in a systematic way (control premia).  Dyck and Zingales (2003) exploit cross-country 
variation in tax enforcement and control premia to show that -- consistent with Corollary 1 -- 
higher levels of tax enforcement lead to lower control premia, even controlling for national 
differences in legal protections for investors.  
In this context, however, we want to provide more disaggregated, within country, 
evidence. For this reason, we focus on Russia, a country where both tax avoidance and 
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the election of Putin represents a turning point in the level of tax enforcement, especially in the 
oil and gas industry. As Figure 4 shows, this increase in enforcement is followed by an increase 
in stock prices, especially in the most affected industry (i.e., Oil and Gas).   
While interesting, this evidence alone is unconvincing. So many changes were taking 
place in Russia at the same time, that it is hard to pinpoint a single cause. For this reason, we will 
rely on two subtler tests.  First, we look at the difference in voting premia across industries. 
Since tax enforcement affected the oil and gas industry disproportionately, during this period 
control premia should drop more in the oil and gas industry than in the other industries. We can 
infer control premia from the difference in voting and nonvoting stock (see Zingales 1994, 
1995). This approach has the advantage to control for any variation in the fundamental value of 
these companies. Second, we look within the oil and gas industry and we test whether oil and gas 
companies that avoided taxes the most exhibited higher returns around the major enforcement 
dates – a prediction that follows from Result 1.  
4.1. Voting  Premia 
The ideal method to measure the value of control relies on control block sales.
25 
Unfortunately, in Russia there is not a sufficient number of such transactions surrounding the 
enforcement period to use this method. Alternatively, one can use the price differential between 
voting and nonvoting shares (i.e., the value of a vote). The value of a vote is related to the value 
of control through the probability a vote will be pivotal (see Zingales (1994, 1995)). If this 
probability, which is a function of the existing ownership structure, remains relatively constant 
over time, we can infer changes in the value of control from changes in the voting primia.
26    
To conduct this test, we collect a sample of all the companies in Russia having two 
classes of stocks with differential voting rights from the Datastream sample of Russian securities 
(124 firms).  To obtain meaningful voting premia, we restrict our attention to companies having 
                                                           
25 For a discussion of the different methods see Dyck and Zingales (2003). 
26 Goetzman et al. (2002) claim that in Russia this voting premium is too high to be justifiable solely on the value of 
control. They attribute it more broadly to the risk that nonvoting stock could be discriminated against in future 
corporate transactions (a corporate governance discount). Even if we accept this interpretation, changes in the voting 
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most important indicators of increased tax enforcement (59 firms).   
Consistent with Corollary 1, Panel A of Table 2 shows a decline in voting premium 
during the period of increased tax enforcement, from 57 percent to 46 percent. The composition 
of the sample, however, changes. Thus, a more appropriate comparison, limited to companies 
that were traded both at the beginning and at the end of the sample period, is provided in Panel 
B, column 1. It shows a decline in the voting premium of 7.8 percentage points, which is 
significant at the 5 percent level.  
Why did it decline? If, as we think, this decline is associated with increased tax 
enforcement, then it should be more pronounced in the companies that were targeted the most by 
this enforcement. Since the main focus of Putin’s actions were the oil & gas industry and mineral 
extraction industry, we examine how much of this decline is concentrated in these industries.  As 
column 2 of panel B shows, the entire decline is concentrated in these extractive industries. 
There is no significant decline in other industries. The observed decline, thus, cannot be 
explained by a general improvement in the Russian corporate governance situation, which would 
have affected all companies similarly. Only something that differentially affected the two set of 
industries, such as tax enforcement, could have caused it.   
3.2 Within-oil-industry  comparisons 
An increase in tax enforcement does not affect all oil and gas companies in the same way. 
Specifically, if some companies were sheltering more beforehand, then they should be more 
affected by the increased enforcement. In the oil industry, a common indicator of tax sheltering 
activity is revenue per barrel of oil.  
Table 3 presents evidence on the enormous variation in revenue per barrel of oil, as 
reported by investment analysts based on filings of firms.  Komineft, a subsidiary of KomiTEK, 
sells its oil at an average price of $7.6 a barrel, while Tomskneft (a subsidiary of Yukos) at only 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
premium over short time periods are a pretty reliable indicator of changes in the degree majority shareholders take 
advantage of their position at the expense of outside ones. 





http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art75$1.1 a barrel!  These reports of aggressive tax avoidance correlate strongly with government 
evaluations of levels of tax avoidance across the integrated oil companies in Russia. 
If Result 3 is correct, companies that were selling their oil at very low prices (i.e., were 
engaged in massive tax sheltering) should experience a greater price appreciation during this 
period of enhanced tax enforcement than companies that were selling their oil closer to market 
prices.  We focus on a panel of four notable enforcement actions taken between July 2000 and 
January 2001, which affected the whole industry as discussed above.  For announcement returns, 
we use excess returns (defined as the cumulative excess return) over a ten day window (t-1, to 
t+9) surrounding the announced enforcement action. In our excess return calculations, we use the 
RTS index (the Rouble index when security quoted in Roubles and the dollar index when the 
share price quoted in dollars). We regress these announcement returns on indicators of tax 
avoidance. As indicator of tax avoidance we use the average selling price per barrel of oil in 
1999, a period prior to the stepped up enforcement actions. 
As Table 3 shows we have two such measures: the average 1999 selling price and the 
average price during the month of August 1999. In the first column of Table 4 we use the first 
datum as an indicator of tax cheating. Unfortunately, the intersection between the companies for 
which we have the average 1999 selling price per barrel and the companies for which we have 
market prices reduces the sample to only 9 observations. Nevertheless, as column 1 of Table 4 
shows, we find companies that were avoiding taxes the least (and hence had higher selling 
prices) had lower market returns around the announcement of higher tax enforcement, and the 
difference is significant at the 5 percent level. This evidence is in contradiction with the 
traditional view of taxes (companies that pay more taxes to begin with should be less affected by 
tax enforcement and hence should have higher returns), but is consistent with our corporate 
governance view.    
To expand the sample, we pool together estimate of the selling price based on the entire 
year and estimates based on the sole month of August (first and second column of Table 3). As 
column 2 of Table 4 shows, the previous results are confirmed in this larger sample. Not 
surprisingly, the magnitude of the coefficient has dropped, since this is a more noisy measure of 
tax avoidance due to monthly fluctuations of oil prices.  Nevertheless, the average selling price 
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announcements of greater tax enforcements. 
These results, although limited by the underlying availability of data, are consistent with 
the corporate governance view of taxes. Private benefits of control, as measured using dual class 
voting shares not only decline when tax enforcement increases, but they decline by a greater 
amount in extractive industries relative to other Russian industries. Similarly, oil companies that 
were more aggressive tax shelterers experience greater returns, when tax enforcement increases.   
5.   Corporate Tax Implications 
The corporate governance view of taxes has also implications for the responsiveness of 
tax revenues to changes in the tax rate. These are the implications we test in this section.  
5.1.   The traditional Laffer-curve and the corporate Laffer-curve 
The intuition that income tax revenues might decline in response to increases in the tax 
rate is popularly known as a Laffer-curve.
27  While initial investigations relied on the intuition 
that labor supply responsiveness to individual income tax schedules could lead to such effects, 
Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995) expanded the underlying mechanism contributing to Laffer-
curve effects beyond labor supply.  In particular, they focus on the flexibility high-earners have 
on the forms of compensation they take, reducing the effectiveness of tax increases.  Finally, 
compliance might suffer with higher tax rates leading to further reductions in taxable income as 
rates rise.
28  In addition to these studies that employ micro data of individual tax returns, a few 
studies have focused on the revenue consequences at the aggregate level by investigating the 
response of aggregate tax revenues to income tax rate changes through case studies of countries 
enacting tax reforms.
29   
                                                           
27 While associated with Arthur Laffer the idea goes back to, at least, Adam Smith.  Interestingly, Smith’s 
interpretation of such effects hinges, in part, on the notion of theft much as our model does.  In The Wealth of 
Nations, he states, “High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of the item taxed and sometimes by 
encouraging smuggling, frequently afford a smaller revenue to government than what might be drawn from more 
modest taxes.”  Book V, chapter 2, paragraph 178. 
28 See Goolsbee (1999) for a recent effort that emphasizes high-income earners and the distinction between 
temporary and permanent responses to tax rate changes.   
29 In particular, Ebrill (1987) finds limited evidence of revenue increases following tax reforms in Jamaica and India 
in th 1980s, IMF (2002) explores the possibility of Laffer effects in Russia following individual income tax reforms 
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slope of such curves will depend on the corporate governance environment and levels of 
ownership concentration. While we are not aware of any explicit discussion of a corporate 
Laffer curve, its basic idea is not dissimilar from the initial motivations for the empirical 
investigations of a Laffer curve with respect to individual tax rates.
30  In particular, the degree to 
which an individual might reclassify compensation or evade taxes has an obvious analogue in 
our model of how a majority shareholder might shelter and divert in response to tax rate changes.  
A key difference in the corporate setting is the presence of outside shareholders and the 
divergence of interest between the optimal level of sheltering from the point of view of majority 
and outside shareholders.  In this respect, the contribution of our model is not so much in raising 
the possibility of a corporate Laffer curve, but in establishing its policy relevance at reasonable 
tax rate levels and, most importantly, in showing how the responsiveness of tax revenues to tax 
rate changes is affected by the level of ownership concentration and by the quality of the 
corporate governance system.   
5.2.   The Data   
The predictions about the effect of corporate governance on tax collection invite an 
exploration of data across a sample of countries.   Accordingly, we construct a panel data set that 
combines information on corporate tax revenues, top corporate marginal rates, ownership 
concentration, and a measure of corporate governance.  For corporate tax rate information, we 
utilize the data recently assembled by the Office of Tax Policy Research (OTPR) at the 
University of Michigan.
31  From the IMF, we obtain data on corporate tax revenues, total tax 
revenues (available from the Government Finance Statistics yearbook) and nominal GDP (from 
the International Finance Statistics yearbook).
32  The data on tax rates are available for a large 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and is inconclusive regarding their presence and Irwin (1998) finds that the tariff reductions widely debated in the 
U.S. in 1888 would have led to revenue decreases counter to some political claims at the time of Laffer-like effects.  
See also the works profiled in IMF (2002) and the edited volume, Gandhi (1987). 
30 A notable exception to this is Hines and Rice (1994).  This examination of profit-shifting by multinational firms 
uses measured elasticities from regression evidence to calculate revenue-maximizing rates for countries.  This 
evidence is, of course, only related to the sensitivities exhibited by multinational firms.   
31 This data is available at www.otpr.org.   
32 Specifically, data on corporate tax revenues are provided as variable g8h1aa in the GFS database and total tax 
revenues as variable g8h1y in the GFS database.  Several countries that have variables from the Dyck and Zingales 
(2003) and LLSV (1998) databases do not provide corporate tax revenues collection statistics further narrowing the 
relevant sample.  These countries include Chile, Hong Kong, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, 





Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Presscross section of countries only after 1979.  Thus, our sample starts in 1979 and ends in 1997, the 
last year for which this information was available.  From the original set of countries in our 
sample, we exclude the major oil-producing countries given the distinctive dynamics of 
corporate tax revenues in these settings.
33   
As a measure of ownership concentration we use the average percentage of common 
shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest non-financial, privately owned 
domestic firms in a given country as computed by La Porta et al. (1998).  As a measure of 
corporate governance, we use the control premium in negotiated control block sales, as 
computed by Dyck and Zingales (2003). Consistent with the spirit of our model, the Dyck and 
Zingales’ measure capture the amount of private benefits extracted by insiders.   
To check whether the effects we find for ownership concentration and private benefits 
merely reflect weakness in the state on other dimensions, we will use two additional measures of 
the institutional environment:  “rule of law” (an index from 0 to 10 that measures the strength of 
a country’s law and order tradition as developed by International Country Risk, a country risk 
rating agency) and tax compliance (an index from 0 to 6 developed by the World 
Competitiveness Report, which assesses the level of tax compliance).
34    
  Table 5 summarizes these variables for the countries in the sample. The top panel 
summarizes the data from the entire panel. The average ratio of corporate tax revenues to total 
tax revenues is 10.3% and the average top marginal rate over the sample is 38.1%.  The 
governance and ownership variables vary considerably by country: ownership concentration 
averages 44.8% with a standard deviation of 13.9%.  Similarly, the measure of private benefits 
averages 13.5% with a standard deviation of 16.0%.  The bottom panel summarizes the data 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Singapore, Taiwan, and Venezuela.  For countries with data on tax rates but no data on corporate tax revenues we 
conducted additional data searches of country sources (including the finance ministry, tax authorities, IMF Article 
IV statistical appendices and other sources) and these searches produced additional data for Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
The electronic version of the GFS variables currently available are not yet updated past 1997.    
33 The countries excluded are the major oil exporting countries defined as (a) OPEC members, (b) affiliated non-
members Oman and Angola and (c) non-OPEC members in the list of the top 10 oil exporting countries. This last 
requirement, which excludes Norway, Mexico and Russia, actually only eliminates Norway, as corporate tax 
revenues for Mexico and Russia are not in our ownership or private benefit samples.  In these oil-rich countries, 
corporate tax revenues are typically not income taxes and corporate tax revenues fluctuate with the world price of oil 
conflating the analysis.   
34 These measures of the rule of law and tax evasion are taken from La Porta et al. (1998, 1999).   





http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art75collapsed by country. In addition to the raw data, we also report country-specific Laffer-curve 
slopes. As described below, these slopes have been obtained by regressing the logarithm of 
corporate tax revenues on the logarithm of the GDP and the level of the corporate tax rate.      
  The panel structure of the sample is useful because we can use the within-country 
variability over time to estimate the slope of the relation between corporate tax revenues and 
corporate tax rates and the cross-country variation to identify how corporate governance and 
ownership concentration influence the slope of this relation.  Since the slope of the Laffer curve 
is estimated using within-country variation, it is important to have a sense of the magnitude and 
the direction of these variations.  Figure 5 plots the changes in corporate tax rates in the countries 
in the OTPR dataset during our sample period. In this period, most of the changes, but not all, are 
tax rate reductions. Furthermore, most, if not all, of these reductions have been accompanied by 
a broadening of the tax base.  Unfortunately, in the regressions we will be unable to control for 
base broadening. Thus, our sample is biased toward finding a negative sloped Laffer curve.  
Our interest, however, is not on the average slope of the Laffer curve, but on how this 
slope changes with ownership concentration and protection of outside investors. Since the 
coupling of base broadening and tax rate reductions appears to be widespread and not unique to 
countries with high ownership concentration or large private benefits, our cross-countries results 
should not be affected by the inability to measure base broadening in a systematic way.
35       
5.3. Results 
  Our maintained assumption is that after controlling for the level of GDP, every country 
faces the same relation between corporate tax revenues and corporate tax rates, except for the 
differences coming from the ownership concentration and the corporate governance. Since the 
corporate sector represents a different share of the economy in each country, we allow for 
                                                           
35 For surveys of the nature of tax reform during this period, see Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1996) for the 
OECD and Thirsk (1997) for developing countries.  There is no evidence, from such sources, that the likelihood of 
base broadenings being coupled with tax rate changes is correlated with income or ownerships concentration or 
corporate governance.  In fact, from a political economy point of view, we believe the link is more likely to bias 
against finding results consistent with the corporate governance view of taxes.  In countries with higher ownership 
concentration, owners should be more effective in lobbying against a base broadening that accompanies a tax rate 
reduction.   
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follows: 
() ( ) = ++ it i i it it it Log Corporate Tax Revenues αβ Log GDP ητ ε +  
where i indexes countries, t is a time subscript and τ is the top marginal corporate tax rate.  η 
provides the slope of the corporate Laffer-curve.  Both tax revenues and GDP are measured in 
unit of local currency.  Since we are estimating in logarithms, however, differences in the 
dimensionality are fully absorbed by the country fixed effects. The standard errors are adjusted 
for potential clustering of the residuals at the country level.      
Column 1 of Table 6 reports estimates of this basic specification.  On average a tax 
increase raises corporate tax revenues, but by a minimal amount: a 10 percentage point increase 
in the tax rates (from 15% to 25%, for example) increases corporate revenues by 1%. The 
average effect, however, is not statistically different from zero.  As we warned, this average 
effect is likely to be downward biased, because in this period most of the changes have been tax 
reductions associated with base broadening.   
Corollary 2, however, has specific predictions on how the shape of the corporate Laffer 
curve will differ across countries.  The first prediction regards the effect of ownership 
concentration. A higher level of insider ownership should reduce the revenue maximizing tax 
rate.  Hence, in countries with a higher level of ownership concentration the coefficient on the 
tax rate should be more negative. We test this prediction by interacting the tax rate with the level 
of ownership concentration as measured by the percentage owned by the three largest 
shareholders.   
  As suggested by the model, the coefficient on this interaction is negative and highly 
statistically significant (column 2). Taken literally, this coefficient suggests that, in the absence 
of controlling blocs, a 10% tax rate increase would result in a 31% increase in corporate tax 
revenues.  As the size of controlling block increases, however, this effect is diminished.  In 
particular, when the three largest shareholders on average own 45% of the stock, increases in the 
tax rate no longer generate any increase in revenues [3.1+(.45)(-6.92)=0].  Finally, when 
controlling blocks are above 45%, tax rate increases are associated with decreases in corporate 





http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art75tax revenues.  Hence, ownership concentration appears to be an important determinant of the 
shape of the Laffer curve as predicted by the model.  
  The coefficient on ownership concentration interacted with tax rates might reflect other 
attributes of the institutional environment that would dictate the responsiveness of tax revenues 
to rate changes.  In a country where there is no enforcement of taxes, for instance, changes in the 
tax rates might have very little effect on tax revenues, reducing the slope of the Laffer curve. If 
countries with low tax enforcement are also countries with high ownership concentration, we 
might have a spurious effect. To exclude this possibility we insert in the regression an interaction 
between the tax rate and other measures of effectiveness of the institutional environment. In 
column 3 we use the law and order tradition of a country. Countries with a stronger law and 
order tradition have a more sloped Laffer curve, this effect, however, is not statistically 
significant. More importantly, the effect of ownership concentration, while slightly reduced in 
magnitude remains statistically significant. Similarly, in column 4 we insert the interaction 
between the tax rate and our measure of tax compliance. Surprisingly, countries where tax 
compliance is higher have a less steep Laffer curve, but once again this effect is not statistically 
significant.  By contrast, our main effect is larger and remains statistically highly significant.
36    
We arrive at the same conclusion if, instead of interacting tax rates and ownership 
concentration, we re-estimate the basic specification in two subsamples with varying levels of 
ownership concentration (columns 5 and 6).  In countries with low (below the median) 
ownership concentration, the coefficient on tax rates is positive, while the coefficient on tax rates 
is negative and marginally significant for countries with high (above the median) ownership 
concentration suggesting distinctive dynamics for tax revenues in countries characterized by low 
and high ownership concentrations.  To verify the robustness of these results, we re-estimate the 
same specification using the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP as the dependent variable. 
This is nothing but a special case of the previous regression, where we impose the coefficient of 
log GDP to be equal to one.  Not surprisingly the results are similar, even if coefficients are less 
precisely estimated.  Nevertheless, the interaction coefficient between tax rates and ownership 
concentration is still statistically significant at the 10% level.  
                                                           
36 As another test we used the log gdp per capita and find identical results. 
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conceivable that changes in tax rates are accompanied by changes in tax enforcement or by other 
changes in the fiscal structure, which might conflate these results.  To try and address this 
problem we scale corporate tax revenues by total tax revenues.  We then repeat all the previous 
regressions using this dependent variable (columns 9 and 10 of Table 6).  The results are 
consistent with the results presented in columns 2 and 8, as the interaction of tax rates and 
ownership concentration carries a negative and statistically significant coefficient.  According to 
these estimates, an increase in tax rates starts to have no effect on tax revenues when the size of 
the controlling bloc reaches 36%.     
Corollary 2 also has implications in terms of the levels of corporate governance: worse 
levels of corporate governance (higher levels ofγ ) reduce the revenue maximizing tax rate.  We 
can test this prediction directly by using the Dyck and Zingales (2003) estimates of control 
premia in different countries as a measure of corporate governance.  Since it is a measure of how 
much controlling shareholders appropriate for themselves, it is directly related toγ .  
Column 1 of Table 7 presents the estimates of our basic specification, where we have 
inserted the interaction between corporate tax rates and the level of control premium. As in the 
previous case, the standard errors are adjusted for potential clustering of the residuals at the 
country level.  As predicted by the model, the interaction term is negative and statistically 
significant, i.e., countries with worse corporate governance have a lower sensitivity of tax 
revenues to tax increases.  In this case, the threshold level of the control premium for a revenue-
neutral relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues is 20%.  As in Table 
6, inclusion of interactions between measures of the rule of law and the tax rate and between tax 
evasion and the tax rate (in columns 2 and 3 of Table 7) do not change the basic result on private 
benefits.   In columns 4 and 5 we divide the sample on the basis of the median level of control 
premium. As predicted by the model, in countries where control premium is below the median 
the coefficient of the tax rate is positive, while in countries where the control premium is above 
the median, the coefficient of the tax rate is negative, albeit not statistically different from zero.  
The model predicts that for low levels of corporate governance (high levels of control 
premium) the relation between corporate tax revenues and corporate tax rates might turn 
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relationship begins to have particular relevance. In particular, there is no reason (except 
symmetry) to divide the sample according to the median level. Given that the median level of 
control premium (7%) is quite low, it is useful to consider alternative partitioning of the sample 
to emphasize the effects of control premia more clearly.   
For this reason, we experiment by dividing the sample at a higher threshold of control 
premium (10%), which still leaves sufficient observations in the set of countries with high 
control premia. As columns 6 and 7 of Table 7 show, the difference in the slope of the Laffer 
curve is much greater between the two samples, not only in statistical terms, but also in 
economic terms. The coefficients have the same order of magnitude, but the opposite sign.  
Column 8 repeat the same exercise with the ratio of corporate tax revenues to GDP. As before, 
the results are similar, but statistically slightly weaker. Finally, in columns 9 and 10 we re-
estimate the same regression using the ratio of corporate tax revenues to total tax revenues as a 
dependent variable. In this specification, the coefficient is no longer statistically significant.  
  The preceding analysis constrains the slope of the Laffer curve to be identical across all 
the countries (but for the effect of ownership concentration or corporate governance).  Now, we 
redo our analysis estimating country-specific slopes by employing the same specification 
country-by-country.  Such a procedure, of course, comes at considerable cost since we estimate 
many more parameters with the same number of observations.  Table 8 analyzes the relation 
between country-specific Laffer-curve slopes and ownership concentration (and governance 
levels) weighting each observation by the precision of each estimate (the inverse of the variance 
of the estimated slope).  
As predicted by the model both the level of ownership and the value of control premia are 
negatively related to the slope of the Laffer-curve estimated using the logarithm of corporate tax 
revenues as a dependent variable (columns 1 and 2), albeit the coefficient is significant only for 
the control premia.  In column 3 of Table 5, both the level of ownership concentration and the 
value of control premia are included as explanatory variables.
37 Not surprisingly, including both 
                                                           
37 Given the limited number of observations, the high degree of correlation between the variables, and the noisiness 
of the estimated country-specific slopes, this is asking for a tremendous amount from the data.   
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concentration, which becomes insignificantly different from zero.   
In columns 4 to 6 we redo the same analysis using as a dependent variable the slope of 
the Laffer curve estimated using the ratio of corporate tax revenue and GDP, while in columns 7 
to 9 the share of corporate tax revenues to total revenues. The results are qualitatively similar 
with the coefficient on private benefits being negative and significant when entered singly in 
columns 5 and 8.  Given the small sample and the inefficiency of the country-by-country 
approach, it is not surprising that the statistical significance of the results is weaker. Overall, 
however, even these results support the predictions of the model: the relation between corporate 
tax revenues and corporate tax rates is deeply influenced by levels of ownership concentration 
and by the degree of protection of outside investors. 
6.    Extensions      
6.1.  The Optimal  Tax System      
  In our model the existence of a positive tax rate increases the incentive to hide income, 
increasing the amount of managerial diversion, while the existence of a tax enforcement reduces 
the willingness to hide income and, hence, the level of insiders’ private benefits. Hence, one 
would be tempted to conclude that, from a corporate governance perspective, the optimal tax rate 
is zero.   
While in the context of our model this conclusion is technically correct, it is practically 
wrong, because it ignores the interdependence between tax rates and enforcement.  What 
restrains managers from sheltering all income, and in so doing diverting a bigger fraction of it to 
their own benefit, is the expected cost of being caught, which we model in reduced form asα .  
This expected cost exists mainly because there exists a tax authority interested in assessing 
income. The monitoring role of the tax authority is so important then managers are willing to pay 
taxes they do not owe in order to reduce the likelihood that the IRS will question them (see 
Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2003)).  
The government’s interest in verifying income, however, is sustained by its ability to 
collect revenues on the income it verifies. Without any corporate tax (or with an extremely low 
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statements) would be left completely in the hands of the non-controlling shareholders, who suffer 
from a chronic free rider problem.  Each one of them has to pay the full cost for monitoring, but 
reaps only a small fraction (equal to their proportional stake in the company) of the benefits.  
Hence, without a corporate tax, α would be close to zero and outside shareholders would be 
provided no additional protection by the expected oversight of company reporting by tax 
authorities.  
  An example that fits the logic of the model are non profits. Financial accounts of non 
profits are scrutinized by the IRS. In fact, this is the only form of oversight non profits are 
subject to. Interestingly, the characteristics of this situation are exactly those predicted by our 
model. Non profits face a zero tax rate in equilibrium, but a positive tax rate out of equilibrium: 
if certain rules are not followed a non profit looses its tax exemption and it becomes subject to 
corporate taxation. Hence, the IRS retains a monetary interest in monitoring non profits, but the 
distortionary effect associated with a positive tax rate is eliminated. This suggests an interesting 
implication for the optimal corporate tax rate from a corporate governance point of view. It 
should be a low tax rate that is increased if violations of certain corporate governance rules are 
detected.  
 
6.2.    Explaining Variation in Tax Enforcement      
  The corporate governance view of taxes has implications on the efficient level of 
enforcement across countries.  Since we have seen that the higher the concentration of ownership 
is, the higher is the incentive to avoid taxes, enforcement should be stronger in countries with 
higher ownership concentration. The same is true for corporate governance. In countries with 
poor corporate governance, the incentive to avoid taxes is stronger and enforcement should be 
stronger to prevent that.  
  These normative predictions are not supported by the data. La Porta et al (1999) find that 
countries with a civil law system (which have poor protection for outside investors and high 
ownership concentration) also tend to have higher marginal tax rates and poor tax enforcement.  
These stylized facts, however, are perfectly consistent with the positive implications of a 
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given level of fiscal pressure, insiders are better off with higher tax rates and lower enforcement, 
because both these conditions will lead to higher diversion and hence higher private benefits.  
Hence, to the extent corporate insiders have greater political power, they will pressure for lower 
enforcement and they will be more willing to settle for higher taxes. Similarly, in countries 
where corporate governance is worse, insiders with political influence will push for lower tax 
enforcement and higher taxes.  Note that where ownership is highly concentrated insiders 
naturally have more political power, because they do not face a free rider problem in lobbying. 
Hence, the corporate governance view of taxes is able to explain the stylized facts identified by 
La Porta et al (1999). 
7. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the interaction between corporate governance and corporate taxation. 
As our analysis of managerial malfeasance at Sibneft suggests, this interaction arises because the 
opacity in financial accounts that sheltering requires facilitates managerial diversion. Based on 
this assumption, our simple model shows how the characteristics of the corporate taxation system 
affect corporate governance and the valuation of firms.  It also shows how the characteristics of 
the corporate governance system affect the responsiveness of tax revenues to changes in tax 
rates, generating a corporate version of the Laffer curve.  Consistent with the model’s 
predictions, we provide evidence that tax enforcement positively affects valuation and that 
ownership concentration and corporate governance play an important role in determining how 
tax rate changes translate into revenue changes.     
If further research confirms the empirical relevance of our theoretical results, several 
implications follow. First, our analysis suggests that improving the corporate tax system – 
through simplification and increased enforcement – may well substantially improve overall 
corporate governance. This new approach to improving corporate governance is particularly 
appealing in light of the difficulties associated with the current alternative: a major overhaul of 
the legal system.   
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which depends critically on corporate governance and ownership concentration.  In particular, 
we show that the revenue-maximizing level of corporate tax rates decreases in the level of 
ownership concentration and in the size of the control premia.  Given that imperfect corporate 
governance and high ownership concentration are widespread, these results carry implications 
for the formulation of corporate tax policy in most countries around the world.   
Finally, our results provide an explanation for the introduction of a corporate tax in the 
United States. When this was introduced in 1909, President Taft said:  
Another merit of this tax [the federal corporate excise tax] is the federal 
supervision which must be exercised in order to make the law effective over the 
annual accounts and business transactions of all corporations.  While the faculty of 
assuming a corporate form has been of the utmost utility in the business world, it is 
also true that substantially all of the abuses and all of the evils which have aroused 
the public to the necessity of reform were made possible by the use of this very 
faculty.  If now, by a perfectly legitimate and effective system of taxation, we are 
incidentally able to possess the Government and the stockholders and the public of 
the knowledge of the real business transactions and the gains and profits of every 
corporation in the country, we have made a long step toward that supervisory 
control of corporations which may prevent a further abuse of power.
38 
 
Unlike 1909, however, today there are many alternative mechanisms to certify corporate 
income (such as mandatory disclosure and external auditing). Nevertheless, we think that tax 
authorities do retain a role, albeit reduced, in verifying corporate income even today. That 
managers were willing to pay taxes on false earnings to keep the IRS off their case (Erickson, 
Hanlon, and Maydew (2003)) suggests that the IRS provides an additional level of monitoring on 
top of the one provided by the SEC (to which all the companies in the Erickson et al. sample 
were subject to). Our conjecture is that this additional efficacy comes from a political economy 
calculus across different Government agencies. Agencies that raise revenues are better funded 
and carry greater political clout than agencies that do not raise revenues. Hence, an essential 
difference about the certification role of the corporate income tax is its ability to generate 
revenues.     
                                                           
38 William H. Taft, President of the United States, June 16, 1909, “Defense of introduction of the first US federal 
corporate excise tax”. 
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important for the United States today, it is certainly important in developing countries and was 
important in the United States in 1909 when corporate taxation was first introduced.   
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Figure 1: The Impact of Tax Enforcement on Returns for Minority Shareholders 
Panel A: The Traditional View (no diversion) 









































































































































































































































































































































































































http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art75Figure 2: Corporate Laffer Curves:  The Relationship between Tax Rates and Tax Revenues With Varying Controlling Block Size Under Different 
Corporate Governance Environments
Note: The two panels of this figure depict the relationship between tax rates and tax revenues for varying levels of controlling block sizes under good corporate governance [(1- gamma) is 0.9] (Panel A) and under poor corporate 
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Controlling Block Size Under Poor Corporate Governance





Figure 3: Corporate Laffer Curves:  The Relationship between Tax Rates and Tax Revenues With Varying Corporate Governance and  Tax 
Enforcement
Note: The two panels of this figure depict the relationship between tax rates and tax revenues for varying levels of the measure of corporate governance (Panel A) and for alternative measures of the tax enforcement parameter 
(Panel B) based on a simulation of the model presented in the paper.  For Panel A, the enforcement parameter (alpha) is 0.7 and the controlling block size (lambda) is 0.5.   For Panel B, the governance index (1- gamma) is 0.9 
























































































Panel B: The Relationship Between Tax Revenues, Tax Rates and 
Tax Enforcement
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http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art75Event date Event description
Cumulative excess 
return (t-1 to t+9) 
using last price on 
RTS
12-Jul-00
Public raid by tax police of four companies controlled 
by oligarchs and announcement of criminal 
investigations.  Coincides with public statements that 
challenge oligarchs and demand increased tax 
payments. -0.054
28-Jul-00
Putin meeting with oligarchs.  Leaked finance ministry 
memorandum showing low tax payments by energy 
firms.  Memorandum provides first mention of Sibneft 
as a low tax payer.  0.114
10-Aug-00
Tax Police remove documents from Sibneft.  Swiss 
police raid offices of Runicom, export trading arm of 
Sibneft. 0.092
25-Nov-00
Government announces further crackdown on tax 
avoidance in oil sector,including proposal to auction 
space on Transneft pipeline.  In days publishes 
perceived lost revenue of more than $9 billion 
annually. 0.035
25-Jan-01
Putin meets with large oil company executives, 
revealing deep knowledge of types of oil tax 
avoidance, and suggesting that this behavior must be 
curtailed 0.017
Note - standard deviation for overlapping 10 day windows for Sibneft,  
Jan 1, 2000 - December 2001 is .074 with mean of 0.007.
Table 1: Tax Enforcement actions and Returns for Sibneft





Average level of the voting premia as a percentage of the company 
equity value prior to enforcement actions (average over four 
months March - June, 2000) 0.57 0.6 0.19 45
Average level of the voting premia post enforcement actions 




Extractive' industry dummy -0.111
(0.051)**
Number of companies in extractive industries 7 7
Total Number of companies 15 15
Adjusted r-squared 0.207
Panel B - Differences Across Industries in Change in Voting Premia
Panel A - Summary Statistics of the Voting Premia Prior and Post Enforcement Actions
Change in Voting Premia
Note.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  ** indicates significant at 5 percent, * indicates significant at 10 percent
Panel A reports the average level of control premia for the unbalanced sample prior to the period of increased enforcement 
and after the enforcement period (in both instances reporting the company average over a four month period to capture the 
largest number of securities).The sample includes all russian equities in Datastream with two classes of stock (124 
companies) where there is movement in the price of both voting and non-voting shares within five days (59 companies). The 
voting premia, expressed as a percentage of the equity value of the company, is defined as the difference in price between 
the voting and non-voting shares multiplied by the number of voting shares divided by the total equity value of the 
company. Panel B reports a regression of the change in the voting premia on a constant and a dummy variable for firms in 
extractive industries (oil and minerals) that were the focus of enforcement actions. This regression restricts attention to the 
more liquid securities that had trading volume both prior and after enforcement, using the average of the immediate month 
preceding and following the enforcement action.
Table 2: Change in Voting Premia during Increased Enforcement Period (June 2000 - February 2001)
 
















crude net selling 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sibneft 326,500
Noyabrskneftegaz 2.2 2.2 325,562
Slavneft (f) 238,600
Megionneftegaz 3.5 2.1 237,350
TNK 513,600
Tyummeneftegaz 2.5 na 36,981
Nizhnevartovskneftegaz 2.5 2.2 363,125
Yukos 894,300
Tomskneft 1.1 ~1.0 205,421
Samaraneftegaz 1.8 ~1.0 153,418
Yuganskneftegaz 1.8 ~1.0 522,788
LUKoil various subsidiaries na  2.8 1,443,700
Permneft na 2.0 na
Rosneft (f) 251,000
Krasnodarneftegaz na na  21,940
Purneftegaz 3.9 3.0 163,743
Sakhalinmorneftegaz 11.0 6.8 28,995
Stavropolneftegaz na 4.2 na
Onaco (f) 159,100
Orenburgneft 8.6 3.0 148,900
Sidanco 250,300
Chernogorneft 5.8 3.9 126,136
Saratovneftegaz 6.7 3.8 27,265
Udmurtneft 6.7 3.8 106,708
Varioganneftegaz 4.3 3.8 49,690
Surgutneftegaz Surgutneftegaz na 7.0 751,500
Bashneft Bashneft na 2.6 245,200
Tatneft (f) Tatneft na na  481,300
KomiTEK Komineft 7.6 na 72,378
Others 1,916,000
(a) "Oil Production Subsidiaries," Troika Dialog Research, February 2000.
(b) "Oil Production Subsidiaries," Troika Dialog Research, February 2000.
(c )
(d)  Estimated from graph, "Oil Sector Report,"  Troika Dialog Research,  March 2000, p. 29.
(e) "Oil Sector Report,"  Troika Dialog Research,  March 2000.
(f) Owned and/or controlled by government.
Investment Bank produced indicators of tax 
optimization 1999
 Average export price, net of export costs and excise in 1999 was $13.50.  Average domestic price net of taxes was 
$7.20
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressDependent Variable
Tax avoidance indicator (average $/barrel selling price 1999) -0.0795
(.0278)**
Tax avoidance indicator (average $/barrel selling price for 1999 if available 
August 1999 otherwise) -0.0235
(.0122)*
Event dummies for four events noted in panel A yes yes
Number of observations 9 18
Adjusted r-squared 0.62 0.18
This table examines whether the market response to announced enforcement actions depends upon how aggressive firms 
have been in avoiding tax payments.  We focus on the four notable enforcement actions taken July2000- January 2001 
introduced in Table 1 (excluding Sibneft specific enforcement action).  The table reports the results of a regression of 
short window excess returns (defined as the cumulative excess return in the ten day window (t-1, to t+9) surrounding the 
announced enforcement action) on indicators of tax avoidance.  In our excess return calculations we use the RTS index, 
using the rouble index when security quoted in roubles and the $ index when the share price quoted in dollars.  For 
indicators of tax avoidance we use the  selling price for oil by company in 1999 reported by investment analysts.  The 
first regression uses the average $1999 selling price.  The second regression uses the August 1999 $ value in case the 
average $1999 selling price is missing.  Data are from RTS daily archive, using the last price reported.  Companies are 
excluded if there is no trading volume and no reported change in last price over the relevant event window.
Table 4: Tax Enforcement Actions and Short-Window Excess Returns in the Oil Industry
Note.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  ** indicates significant at 5 percent, * indicates significant at 10 
percent
10 day excess returns around 
enforcement actions
 





http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art75No of Obs.  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel Variables
Log Corporate Tax Revenues 545 3.6965 3.0782 2.8979 -5.2983 14.4093
Corporate Tax Revenues/Total Tax 
Revenues 540 0.1141 0.0879 0.0897 0.0093 0.4357
Corporate Tax Revenues/GDP 545 0.0241 0.0205 0.0150 0.0030 0.0910
Marginal Tax Rates 545 0.3781 0.3800 0.0972 0.0980 0.6000
Ownership Concentration 545 0.4370 0.4700 0.1386 0.1800 0.6700
Measure of Private Benefits 458 0.1137 0.0629 0.1403 -0.0430 0.6495
Rule of Law 545 7.7174 8.5700 2.3818 1.9000 10.0000
Tax Evasion 521 3.3043 3.4100 0.9020 1.7700 4.6700
Maximum Within-Country Difference in 
Marginal Tax Rates 545 0.1615 0.1670 0.0740 0.0200 0.3100
Cross-Sectional Variables
Country-Specific Laffer Slopes Using 
Log Corporate Tax Revenues 32 0.9731 -0.1183 5.6650 -7.2815 23.2709
Country-Specific Laffer Slopes Using 
Corporate Tax Revenue to Total 
Revenue Shares 32 0.0510 -0.0025 0.4961 -1.0454 1.7917
Country-Specific Laffer Slopes Using 
Corporate Tax Revenue to GDP Shares 32 0.0244 0.0003 0.1716 -0.3528 0.7774
Ownership Concentration 32 0.4559 0.5100 0.1390 0.1800 0.6700
Measure of Private Benefits 28 0.1504 0.0731 0.1809 -0.0430 0.6495
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Corporate Laffer Curve Specifications
Notes:  The table provides descriptive statistics for variables employed in Tables 6 to 8.  The top panel provides descriptive statistics for 
variables form the unbalanced panel while the bottom panel provides variables from the cross-section of country when the Laffer equations 
are run country-by-country.   "Log Corporate Tax Revenues" is the natural log of corporate tax revenues as measured in local currency and 
as provided in the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) electronic database.  "Corporate Tax Revenues/Total Tax Revenues" is the ratio of 
corporate tax revenues to total tax revenues as provided in GFS and as described in text.  "Corporate Tax Revenues/GDP" is the ratio of 
corporate tax revenues to GDP as provided in GFS and IFS and as described in text. "Marginal Tax Rates" are the top corporate statutory 
rates as provided in the OTPR database and as described in the text.  "Ownership Concentration" is the average percentage of common 
shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms in a given country as computed 
by La Porta et al. (1998).   The "Measure of Private Benefits" is the control 
premium in negotiated control block sales, as computed by Dyck and Zingales (2003).  "Rule of Law" is a measure of the law and order 
tradition as reported in the International Country Risk Guide and reported in La Porta et al. (1998).  "Tax Evasion" is a measure of tax 
compliance reported in the Global Competitiveness Report for 1995 as reported in La Porta et al. (1999).  "Maximum Within-Country 
Difference in Marginal Tax Rates" is the maximum difference between tax rates for a given country during the panel.
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Dependent Variable:
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )( 6 ) ( 7 )( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 1 0 )
Marginal Tax Rates 0.1033 3.1494 0.6822 5.4670 0.8330 -0.9326 -0.0022 0.0432 -0.0423 0.1994
(0.5446) (1.2814) (2.1660) (2.9616) (0.6357) (0.5094) (0.0083) (0.0216) (0.0359) (0.1351)
-6.9244 -5.0904 -8.5898 -0.1033 -0.5470





YYYY YY YY YY
Log GDP Interactions 
with Fixed Effects? YYYY YY YY YY
Number of Countries 35 35 35 33 17 18 35 35 35 35
No Obs. 545 545 545 521 309 236 545 545 540 540
R-Squared 0.9593 0.9606 0.9609 0.9597 0.9034 0.9806 0.5171 0.5231 0.6764 0.6824
measure of ownership concentration.  Standard errors are presented in parentheses and correct for clustering of residuals at the country level.
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the log of corporate tax revenues.  The dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is the ratio of corporate tax revenues to GDP.   The dependent variable in columns 7 and 8 is the ratio of 
corporate tax revenues to total tax revenues.  "Marginal Tax Rates" are the top corporate statutory rate as provided in the OTPR database and as described in the text.  The "Marginal Tax Rate Interacted with Ownership 
Concentration" is the product of the tax rate and the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms in a given country as computed by La 
Porta et al. (1998).   The "Marginal Tax Rate Interacted with Rule of Law" is the product of the tax rate and a measure of the law and order tradition as reported in the International Country Risk Guide and reported in La Porta et al. 
(1998).  The "Marginal Tax Rate Interacted with Tax Evasion" is the product of the tax rate and a measure of tax compliance reported in the Global Competitiveness Report for 1995 as reported in La Porta et al. (1999).  All 








Log of Corporate Tax Revenues
Marginal Tax Rates 
Interacted with 
Ownership Concentration
Marginal Tax Rates 
Interacted with Rule of 
Law
Marginal Tax Rates 
Interacted with Tax 
Evasion

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.2627 -1.0706 1.3285 1.2438 -0.4072 1.0444 -0.9598 0.0137 0.0182
(0.5756) (1.1913) (1.9587) (0.5249) (0.5539) (0.4798) (0.5281) (0.0098) (0.0569)
-6.0502 -5.4275 -6.0930 -0.0698 -0.2866





YYY YY YY Y Y
YYY YY YY Y Y
Number of Countries 31 31 31 16 15 18 13 31 31
No Obs. 458 458 458 270 188 309 149 458 453
R-Squared 0.9588 0.9593 0.9588 0.8810 0.9796 0.8687 0.9861 0.5599 0.6929
Note: The dependent variables are: the log of corporate tax revenues (columns 1-5), the ratio of corporate tax revenues to GDP (column 6), the  ratio of corporate tax revenues to total tax revenues (column 7). 
"Marginal Tax Rates" are the top corporate statutory rate as provided in the OTPR database and as described in the text.  The "Marginal Tax Rate Interacted with Measure of Private Benefits" is the product of the tax 
rate and the control premium in negotiated control block sales, as computed by Dyck and Zingales (2003).    The "Marginal Tax Rate Interacted with Rule of Law" is the product of the tax rate and a measure of the law 
and order tradition as reported in the International Country Risk Guide and reported in La Porta et al. (1998).  The "Marginal Tax Rate Interacted with Tax Evasion" is the product of the tax rate and a measure of tax 
compliance reported in the Global Competitiveness Report for 1995 as reported in La Porta et al. (1999).  All specifications employ country fixed effects and the interactions of those country fixed effects with log 
GDP.   Standard errors are presented in parentheses and correct for clustering of residuals at the country level.
All Countries
Country Fixed Effects?
Log GDP Interactions 
with Fixed Effects?
Marginal Tax Rates 
Interacted with 







All Countries All Countries
Marginal Tax Rates 
Interacted with Rule of 
Law
Marginal Tax Rates 
Interacted with Tax 
Evasion
Table 7: Corporate Laffer Curves For Corporate Governance













All Countries All Countries
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0.7423 0.6958 0.8237 0.0196 0.0108 0.0221 0.0369 0.0139 0.0575
1.6150 (0.4673) (1.6805) (0.0215) (0.0065) (0.0220) (0.1046) (0.0180) (0.0706)
-2.3521 -0.7355 -0.0481 -0.0348 -0.1206 -0.1134
(2.8291) (3.6352) (0.0377) (0.0517) (0.1869) (0.1771)
 -3.4626 -2.6458  -0.0479 -0.0244  -0.1020 -0.0417
 (1.4096) (1.7441)  (0.0174) (0.0263)  (0.0488) (0.1005)
No Obs. 32 28 26 32 28 26 32 28 26
Weighted by the Inverse of 
the Variance of the 
Measured Slope? YYY YYY YYY
R-Squared 0.0214 0.1332 0.1141 0.0367 0.1370 0.1381 0.0134 0.0507 0.0633
Dependent Variable: Country 
Specific Laffer Curve Slopes using 
Corporate Tax Revenues/GDP
Table 8: The Importance of Corporate Governance and Ownership Concentration for Country-Specific Laffer Curve Slopes
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the country-specific Laffer-curve slope generated by regressing the log of corporate tax revenues on log GDP and the corporate statutory rates.  
The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the country-specific Laffer-curve slope generated by regressing the ratio of corporate tax revenues in GDP on log GDP and the corporate statutory rates.  
The dependent variable in columns 7-9 is the country-specific Laffer-curve slope generated by regressing the rateio of corporate tax revenues to total tax revenues on log GDP and the corporate 
statutory rates.  "Ownership Concentration" is the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms in 
a given country as computed by La Porta et al. (1998).   The "Measure of Private Benefits" is control premium in negotiated control block sales, as computed by Dyck and Zingales (2003).   All 
specifications are weighted least squares regressions where observations are weighted by the inverse of the variance of the measured slopes from country-specific regressions.  
Measure of Private Benefits
Constant
Dependent Variable: Country 
Specific Laffer Curve Slopes using 
Log of Corporate Tax Revenues
Ownership Concentration
Dependent Variable: Country 
Specific Laffer Curve Slopes using 
Corporate Tax Revenues/Total Tax 
Revenues
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